

Chapter II

The Essence of Acts of Empathy

1. The Method of the Investigation

All controversy over empathy is based on the implied assumption that foreign subjects and their experience are given to us. Thinkers deal with the circumstances of the occurrence, the effects, and the legitimacy of this givenness. But the most immediate undertaking is to consider the phenomenon of givenness in and by itself and to investigate its essence. We shall do this in the setting of the “phenomenological reduction.”

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The goal of phenomenology is to clarify and thereby to find the ultimate basis of all knowledge. To reach this goal it considers nothing that is in any way “doubtful,” nothing that can be eliminated. In the first place, it does not use any results of science whatsoever. This is self-evident, for a science which proposes ultimately to clarify all scientific knowledge must not, in turn, be based on a science already extant, but must be grounded in itself.

Is it based on natural experience then? By no means, for even this as well as its continuation, research in natural science, is subject to diverse interpretations (as in materialistic or idealistic philosophy) and thus stands in need of clarification. Therefore, the entire surrounding world, the physical as well as the psycho-physical, the bodies as well as the souls of men and animals (including the psycho-physical person of the investigator himself) is subject to the exclusion or reduction.

<2> What can be left if the whole world and even the subject experiencing it are cancelled? In fact, there remains an infinite field of pure investigation. For let us consider what this exclusion means. I can doubt whether what I see before me exists. Deception is possible. Therefore, I must exclude and make no use of the positing of existence. But what I cannot exclude, what is not subject to doubt, is my experience of the thing (the perception, memory, or other kind of comprehension) together with its correlate, the full “phenomenon of the thing” (the object given as the same in series of diverse perceptions or memories). This phenomenon retains its entire character and can be made into an object of consideration. (There are difficulties in seeing how it is possible to suspend the positing of existence and still retain the full character of perception. The case of hallucination illustrates this possibility. Let us suppose that someone suffers from hallucinations and has insight into his condition. In a room with a healthy person, he may suppose that he sees a door in the wall and want to go through it. When his attention is called to this, he realizes that he is hallucinating again. Now he no longer believes that the door is present, even being able to transfer himself into the “cancelled” perception. This offers him an excellent opportunity for studying the nature of perception, including the positing of existence, even though he no longer participates in this.)

Thus there remains the whole “phenomenon of the world” when its positing has been suspended. And these “phenomena” are the object of phenomenology. However, it is not sufficient merely to comprehend them individually and to explain what is implied in them, inquiring into the tendencies enclosed in the simple having of the phenomenon. Rather, we must press forward to their essence. Each phenomenon forms an exemplary basis for the consideration of essence. The phenomenology of perception, not satisfied with describing the single perception, wants to ascertain what “perception is essentially as such.” It acquires this knowledge from the single case in ideational abstraction.²⁰

<3> We must still show what it means to say that my experience is not to be excluded. It is not indubitable that I exist, this empirical “I” of this name and station, given such and such attributes. My

whole past could be dreamed or be a deceptive recollection. Therefore, it is subject to the exclusion, only remaining an object of consideration as a phenomenon. But "I," the experiencing subject who considers the world and my own person as phenomenon, "I" am in experience and only in it, am just as indubitable and impossible to cancel as experience itself.

Now let us apply this way of thinking to our case. The world in which we live is not only a world of physical bodies but also of experiencing subjects external to us, of whose experiences we know. This knowledge is not indubitable. Precisely here we are subject to such diverse deceptions that occasionally we are inclined to doubt the possibility of knowledge in this domain at all. But the phenomenon of foreign psychic life is indubitably there, and we now want to examine this a little further.

However, the direction of the investigation is not yet clearly prescribed. We could proceed from the complete, concrete phenomenon before us in our experiential world, the phenomenon of a psycho-physical individual which is clearly distinguished from a physical thing. This individual is not given as a physical body, but as a sensitive, living body belonging to an "I," an "I" that senses, thinks, feels, and wills. The living body of this "I" not only fits into my phenomenal world but is itself the center of orientation of such a phenomenal world. It faces this world and communicates with me.

And we could investigate how whatever appears to us beyond the mere physical body given in outer perception is constituted within consciousness.

Moreover, we could consider the single, concrete experiences of these individuals. Different ways of being given would then appear, and we could further pursue these. It would become apparent that there are other ways of being given "in the symbolic relation" than the givenness worked out by Lipps. I not only know what is expressed in facial expressions and gestures, but also what is hidden behind them. Perhaps I see that someone makes a sad face but is not really sad. I may also hear someone make an indiscreet remark and blush. Then I not only understand the remark and see shame in the blush, but I also discern that he knows his remark is indiscreet and is ashamed of himself for

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having made it. Neither this motivation nor the judgment about his remark is expressed by any “sensory appearance.”

This investigation will be concerned with these various ways of being given and possibly with the underlying relationships present. But a still more radical examination is possible. All these data of foreign experience point back to the basic nature of acts in which foreign experience is comprehended. We now want to designate these acts as empathy, regardless of all historical traditions attached to the word. To grasp and describe these acts in the greatest essential generality will be our first undertaking.

2. Description of Empathy in Comparison With Other Acts

We shall be able to see emphatic acts best in their individuality if we confront them with other acts of pure consciousness (our field of consideration after making the described reduction). Let us take an example to illustrate the nature of the act of empathy. A friend tells me that he has lost his brother and I become aware of his pain. What kind of an awareness is this? I am not concerned here with going into the basis on which I infer the pain. Perhaps his face is pale and disturbed, his voice toneless and strained. Perhaps he also expresses his pain in words. Naturally, these things can all be investigated, but they are not my concern here. I would like to know, not how I arrive at this awareness, but what it itself is.

(a) *Outer Perception and Empathy*

Needless to say, I have no outer perception of the pain. Outer perception is a term for acts in which spatio-temporal concrete being and occurring come to me in embodied givenness. This being has the quality of being there itself right now; it turns this or that side to me and the side turned to me is embodied in a specific sense. It is primordially there in comparison with sides co-perceived but averted.

The pain is not a thing and is not given to me as a thing, even when I am aware of it “in” the pained countenance. I perceive this countenance outwardly and the pain is given “at one” with it.

There is a close, yet very loose, parallel between empathic acts and the averted sides of what is seen, because in progressive

perception I can always bring new sides of the thing to primordial givenness. Each side can, in principle, assume this primordial givenness I select. I can consider the expression of pain, more accurately, the change of face I empathically grasp as an expression of pain, from as many sides as I desire. Yet, in principle, I can never get an “orientation” where the pain itself is primordially given.

Thus empathy does not have the character of outer perception, though it does have something in common with outer perception: In both cases the object itself is present here and now. We have come to recognize outer perception as an act given primordially. But, though empathy is not outer perception, this is not to say that it does not have this “primordially.”

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(b) Primordially and Non-primordially

There are things other than the outer world given to us primordially; for instance, there is ideation which is the intuitive comprehension of essential states. Insight into a geometric axiom is primordially given as well as valuing. Finally and above all, our own experiences as they are given in reflection have the character of primordially.

Since empathy deals with grasping what is here and now, it is trivial to say that it is not ideation. (Whether it can serve as a basis for ideation, which is the attainment of an essential knowledge of experiences, is another question.)

Now there is still the question of whether empathy has the primordially of our own experience. Before we can answer this question, we must further differentiate the meaning of primordially. All our own present experiences are primordially. What could be more primordial than experience itself?²¹

But not all experiences are primordially given nor primordially in their content. Memory, expectation, and fantasy do not have their object bodily present before them. They only represent it, and this character of representation is an immanent, essential moment of these acts, not a sign from their objects.

Finally, there is the question of the givenness of our own experiences themselves. It is possible for every experience to be

primordially given, i.e., it is possible for the reflecting glance of the "I" in the experience to be there bodily itself. Furthermore, it is possible for our own experiences to be given non-primordially in memory, expectation, or fantasy.

Now we again take up the question of whether empathy is primordial and in what sense.

(c) *Memory, Expectation, Fantasy, and Empathy*

There is a well-known analogy between acts of empathy and acts in which our own experiences are given non-primordially.

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The memory of a joy is primordial as a representational act now being carried out, though its content of joy is non-primordial. This act has the total character of joy which I could study, but the joy is not primordially and bodily there, rather as having once been alive (and this "once," the time of the past experience, can be definite or indefinite). The present non-primordially points back to the past primordially. This past has the character of a former "now." Accordingly, memory posits, and what is remembered has being.

Further, there are two possibilities: The "I" as the subject of the act of remembering, in this act of representation, can look back at the past joy. Then the past joy is the intentional object of the "I," its subject being with and in the "I" of the past. Thus the present "I" and the past "I" face each other as subject and object. They do not coincide, though there is a consciousness of sameness. But this is not a positive identification and, moreover, the distinction between the primordially remembering "I" and the "I" non-primordially remembered persists. Memory can also be accomplished in other modes. The same act of representation in which what is remembered emerges before me as a whole implies certain tendencies. When these unfold, they expose "traits" in their temporal course, how the whole remembered experience was once primordially constituted.²²

This process can occur passively "in me" or I can do it actively step by step. I can even carry out the passive, as well as the active, course of memory without reflecting, without having the present "I," the subject of the act of memory, before me in any way. Or I can expressly set myself back to that time in a continuous stream

of experiences, allowing the past experiential sequence to re-awaken, living in the remembered experience instead of turning to it as an object. However, the memory always remains a representation with a non-primordial subject which is in contrast with the subject doing the remembering. The reproduction of the former experience is the clarification of what was vaguely intended at first. <8>

At the end of the process there is a new objectification. I now unite the past experience, which first arose before me as a whole and which I then took apart while projecting myself into it, in an "apperceptive grip." Diverse forms of memory can have a variety of gaps. Thus it is possible for me to represent a past situation to myself and be unable to remember my inner behavior in this situation. As I transfer myself back into this situation, a surrogate for the missing memory comes into focus. This image of the past behavior is not, however, a representation of what is past. Rather, it is the requisite completion of the memory image to get the meaning of the whole. It can have the character of doubt, conjecture, or possibility, but never the character of being.

It is hardly necessary to go into the case of expectation, since it is so parallel. But something can still be said about free fantasy. Fantasy, too, can be accomplished in various ways: An experience of fantasy can arise as a whole and the tendencies implied in it fulfilled step by step. In fantasy there is no temporal distance, filled by continuous experiences, between the fantasizing and the fantasized "I," provided I do not just happen to be dealing with a fantasized memory or expectation.

But there is also a distinction here. The "I" producing the fantasized world is primordial; the "I" living in it is non-primordial. The fantasized experiences are in contrast with memory because they are not given as a representation of actual experiences but as the non-primordial form of present experiences. This "present" does not indicate a present of objective time but an experienced present which in this case can only be objectified in a "neutral"²³ present of fantasized time. The neutralized or non-positing form of the present memory (the representation of a givenness now real but not possessing a body) is in contrast with a neutralized pre- and post-memory. That is to say, it is in contrast <9>

with a fantasy of the past and of the future, with the representation of unreal past and future experiences. It is also possible for me to meet myself in the realm of fantasy (as well as in memory or expectation), i.e., to meet an "I" which I recognize as myself though there is no linking continuity of experience to establish the unity, so to speak, to meet my mirror image. (This reminds us, for example, of the experience Goethe relates in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. One evening he was coming from Sesenheim after saying good-bye to Friederike, and he met himself on the way in his future form.) But this does not seem to be the genuine fantasy of our own experiences. Rather, it seems to be an analogue to empathy which can be understood only from the viewpoint of empathy.

So now to empathy itself. Here, too, we are dealing with an act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content. And this content is an experience which, again, can be had in different ways such as in memory, expectation, or in fantasy. When it arises before me all at once, it faces me as an object (such as the sadness I "read in another's face"). But when I inquire into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to clear givenness to myself), the content, having pulled me into it, is no longer really an object. I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it, am at the subject of the content in the original subject's place. And only after successfully executed clarification, does the content again face me as an object.²⁴

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Thus in all the cases of the representation of experiences considered, there are three levels or modalities of accomplishment even if in a concrete case people do not always go through all levels but are often satisfied with one of the lower ones. These are (1) the emergence of the experience, (2) the fulfilling explication, and (3) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience. On the first and third levels, the representation exhibits the non-primordial parallel to perception, and on the second level it exhibits the non-primordial parallel to the having of the experience. The subject of the empathized experience, however, is not the subject empathizing, but another. And this is what is fundamentally new in contrast with the memory, expectation, or the fantasy of our own experiences. These two subjects are sepa-

rate and not joined together, as previously, by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity of experience. And while I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial joy. It does not issue live from my "I." Neither does it have the character of once having lived like remembered joy. But still much less is it merely fantasized without actual life. This other subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non-primordial experience I feel, as it were, led by a primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience.

Thus empathy is a kind of act of perceiving [*eine Art erfahrender Akte*] *sui generis*. We have set ourselves the task of expounding it in its peculiarity before tackling any other question (of whether such experience is valid or how it occurs). And we have conducted this investigation in purest generality. Empathy, which we examined and sought to describe, is the experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of the experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness is experienced. We only discussed the pure "I," the subject of experience, on the subject's as well as on the object's side. Nothing else was drawn into the investigation.

The experience which an "I" as such has of another "I" as such looks like this. This is how human beings comprehend the psychic life of their fellows. Also as believers they comprehend the love, the anger, and the precepts of their God in this way; and God can comprehend people's lives in no other way. As the possessor of complete knowledge, God is not mistaken about people's experiences, as people are mistaken about each others' experiences. But people's experiences do not become God's own, either; nor do they have the same kind of givenness for Him.

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3. Discussion in Terms of Other Descriptions of Empathy— Especially That of [T.] Lipps—and Continuation of the Analysis

Naturally, this general presentation of the nature of "empathy on the whole" does not accomplish much. We must now investigate how empathy is differentiated as the perception of psycho-

physical individuals and their experience of personality, etc. Yet from the conclusions already reached, it is possible to criticize some historical theories of how foreign consciousness is experienced. By means of this criticism, we can also complete our analysis along some lines.

Lipps' description of the experience of empathy agrees with ours in many respects. (We shall not deal with his causal-genetic hypothesis of the circumstances of empathy, the theory of inner imitation, because he mixes it almost entirely with pure description.) To be sure, he does not conduct his investigation in pure generality, sticking to the case of the psycho-physical individual and to "symbolic givenness," but we can still generalize in part the conclusions he reaches.

(a) *Points of Agreement*

Lipps depicts empathy as an "inner participation" in foreign experiences. Doubtless, this is equivalent to our highest level of the consummation of empathy—where we are "at" the foreign subject and turned with it to its object. He stresses the objectivity or the "demanding" character of empathy and thus expresses what we mean by designating it as a kind of act undergone. Further, he indicates how empathy is akin to memory and expectation. But this brings us directly to a point where our ways part.

(b) *The Tendency to Full Experiencing*

Lipps speaks of the fact that every experience about which I know, including those remembered and expected as well as those empathized, "tends" to be fully experienced. And it is fully experienced if nothing in me opposes it. At the same time the "I," an object until now, is experienced. This is so whether the "I" is past or future, my own or the foreign "I." He also calls this full experiencing of foreign experience empathy. Indeed, he first sees full empathy here, the other being an incomplete, preliminary level of empathy.

That the subject of the remembered, expected, or empathized experience in this second form of memory, expectation, or empathy is not properly an object is in agreement with our conception. But we do not agree that there is a complete coincidence with the

remembered, expected, or empathized "I," that they become one. Lipps confuses the following two acts: (1) being drawn into the experience at first given objectively and fulfilling its implied tendencies with (2) the transition from non-primordial to primordial experience.

A memory is entirely fulfilled and identified when one has followed out all its tendencies to explication and established the experiential continuity to the present. But this does not make the remembered experience primordial. The present viewpoint of the remembered state of affairs is completely independent of the remembered viewpoint. I can remember a perception and now be convinced that I was formerly under a delusion. I remember my discomfort in an embarrassing situation and now think it was very funny. In this case the memory is no more incomplete than if I again take the former viewpoint.

We agree that a shift from remembered, expected or empathized to primordial experience is possible. But we do not agree that, when this tendency has been fulfilled, memory, expectation, or empathy is still present.

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Let us consider the case further. I actively bring to mind a former joy, for example, of a passed examination. I transfer myself into it, i.e., I turn to the joyful event and depict it to myself in all its joyfulness. Suddenly I notice that I, this primordial, remembering "I," am full of joy. I remember the joyful event and take primordial joy in the remembered event. However, the memory joy and the memory "I" have vanished or, at most, persist beside the primordial joy and the primordial "I." Naturally, this primordial joy over past events can also occur directly. This would be a mere representation of the event without my remembering the former joy or making a transition from the remembered to the primordial event. Finally, I may be primordially joyful over the past joy, making the difference between these two acts especially prominent.

Now let us take the parallel to empathy. My friend comes to me beaming with joy and tells me he has passed his examination. I comprehend his joy empathically; transferring myself into it, I comprehend the joyfulness of the event and am now primordially joyful over it myself. I can also be joyful without first compre-

hending the joy of the other. Should the examination candidate step into the tense, impatient family circle and impart the joyful news, in the first place, they will be primordially joyful over this news. Only when they have been “joyful long enough” themselves, will they be joyful over their joy or, perhaps as the third possibility, be joyful over his joy.²⁵ But his joy is neither given to us as primordial joy over the event nor as primordial joy over his joy. Rather it is given as this non-primordial act of empathy that

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we have already described more precisely. On the other hand, if, as in memory, we put ourselves in the place of the foreign “I” and suppress it while we surround ourselves with its situation, we have one of these situations of “appropriate” experience. If we then again concede to the foreign “I” its place and ascribe this experience to him, we gain a knowledge of his experience. (According to Adam Smith, this is how foreign experience is given.) Should empathy fail, this procedure can make up the deficiency, but it is not itself an experience. We could call this surrogate for empathy an “assumption” but not empathy itself, as [A.] Meinong does.²⁶ Empathy in our strictly defined sense as the experience of foreign consciousness can only be the non-primordial experience which announces a primordial one. It is neither the primordial experience nor the “assumed” one.

(c) *Empathy and Fellow Feeling*

Should empathy persist beside primordial joy over the joyful event (beside the comprehension of the joy of the other), and, moreover, should the other really be conscious of the event as joyful (possibly it is also joyful for me, for example, if this passed examination is the condition for a trip together so that I am happy for him as the means to it), we can designate this primordial act as joy-with-him or, more generally, as fellow feeling (*sympathy*).²⁷ Sympathized and empathized joy need not necessarily be the same in content at all. (They are certainly not the same in respect to quality, since one is a primordial and the other a non-primordial experience.) The joy of the most intimate participant will generally be more intense and enduring than the others’ joy.

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But it is also possible for the others’ joy to be more intense. They

may be naturally capable of more intense feelings than he; they may be “altruistic” and “values for others” *eo ipso* mean more to them than “values for themselves”; finally, this event may have lost some of its value through circumstances unknown to the others. On the other hand, in the ideal case (where there is no deception) empathic joy expressly claims to be the same in every respect as comprehended joy, to have the same content and only a different mode of being given.

(d) *Negative Empathy*

Lipps has called the primordial experience that can be added to the experience of empathy full, positive empathy. With this he has contrasted a negative empathy: the case in which the tendency of the empathic experience to become a primordial experience of my own cannot be realized because “something in me” opposes it. This may be either a momentary experience of my own or my kind of personality.

We also want to investigate this further, again, in pure generality. The “personality” has transcendencies as well as a qualitatively developed present “I,” which are themselves subject to exclusion and are only considered by us as phenomena. Let us take the following case. I am completely filled with grief over a bereavement at the moment my friend tells me the joyful news. This grief does not permit the predominance of sympathy with the joy. There is a conflict (again, not real but phenomenal) involving two levels. The “I” living entirely in the grief perhaps at first experiences empathy as a “background experience.” This is comparable to peripheral areas of the visual field that are seen and yet are not intentional objects in the full sense, are not objects of actual attention. And now the “I” feels pulled toward two sides at once, both experiences claiming to be a “cogito” in a specific sense (i.e., acts in which the “I” lives and turns toward its object). Both seek to pull the “cogito” into themselves. This is precisely the experience of being split. Thus on the first level there is a split between our own actual experience and the empathic experience. It is further possible for the “I” to be pulled into the empathic experience, to turn to the other’s joyful object. At the same time, this other pull may not cease so that an actual joy can prevail.

But it seems to me that in neither case is it a question of a specific trait of in- or with-feeling (*empathy or sympathy*), but of one of the typical forms of transition from one "cogito" to another in general. There are numerous such transitions: A cogito can be completely lived out so that I can then "entirely spontaneously" flow over into another one. Further, while I am living in one cogito, another can appear and pull me into it without causing conflict. Finally, the tendencies implied in the cogito and not yet entirely consummated can obstruct the transition to a new cogito. And all this is just as possible in perception, memory, in theoretical contemplation, etc. as in empathy.

(e) *Empathy and a Feeling of Oneness*

I would also like to examine a little more closely this unity of our own and the foreign "I" in empathy that was earlier rejected. Lipps says that as long as empathy is complete (exactly what we no longer recognize as empathy) there is no distinction between our own and the foreign "I," that they are one. For example, I am one with the acrobat and go through his motions inwardly. A distinction only arises when I step out of complete empathy and reflect on my "real 'I.'" Then the experiences not coming from me appear to belong to "the other" and to lie in his movements. Were this description correct, the distinction between foreign and our own experiences, as well as that between the foreign and our own "I," would actually be suspended. This distinction would first occur in association with various "real 'I's'" or psycho-physical individuals. What my body is doing to my body and what the foreign body is doing to the foreign body would then remain completely obscure, since I am living "in" the one in the same way as in the other, experience the movements of the one in the same way as those of the other.

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This assertion is not only refuted by its consequences, but is also an evidently false description. I am not one with the acrobat but only "at" him. I do not actually go through his motions but *quasi*. Lipps also stresses, to be sure, that I do not outwardly go through his motions. But neither is what "inwardly" corresponds to the movements of the body, the experience that "I move," primordial; it is non-primordial for me. And in these non-primor-

dial movements I feel led, accompanied, by his movements. Their primordially is declared in my non-primordial movements which are only there for me in him (again understood as experienced, since the pure bodily movement is also perceived outwardly). Every movement the spectator makes is primordial. For example, he may pick up his dropped program and not “know” it because he is living entirely in empathy. But should he reflect in the one instance as in the other (for which it is necessary for his “I” to carry out the transition from one cogito to the other), he would find in one instance a primordial and in the other a non-primordial givenness. And this non-primordially is not simple but is a non-primordially in which foreign primordially becomes apparent. What led Lipps astray in his description was the confusion of self-forgetfulness, through which I can surrender myself to any object, with a dissolution of the “I” in the object. Thus, strictly speaking, empathy is not a feeling of oneness.

But this does not mean that there is no such thing as a feeling of oneness. Let us go back to sympathy with foreign experience. We said that the “I” in co-experiencing another is turned toward the object of the foreign experience, that it has the foreign experience present empathically at the same time, and that the sympathetic and empathic act do not have to coincide in content. Now let us modify this case somewhat. A special edition of the paper reports that the fortress has fallen. As we hear this, all of us are seized by an excitement, a joy, a jubilation. We all have “the same” feeling. Have thus the barriers separating one “I” from another broken down here? Has the “I” been freed from its monadic character? Not entirely. I feel my joy while I empathically comprehend the others’ and see it as the same. And, seeing this, it seems that the non-primordial character of the foreign joy has vanished. Indeed, this phantom joy coincides in every respect with my real live joy, and theirs is just as live to them as mine is to me. Now I intuitively have before me what they feel. It comes to life in my feeling, and from the “I” and “you” arises the “we” as a subject of a higher level.²⁸

And it is also possible for us to be joyful over the same event, though not filled with exactly the same joy. Joyfulness may be more richly accessible to the others, which difference I compre-

hend empathically. I empathically arrive at the "sides" of joyfulness obstructed in my own joy. This ignites my joy, and only now is there complete coincidence with what is empathized. If the same thing happens to the others, we empathically enrich our feeling so that "we" now feel a different joy from "I," "you," and "he" in isolation. But "I," "you," and "he" are retained in "we." A "we," not an "I," is the subject of the empathizing. Not through the feeling of oneness, but through empathizing, do we experience others. The feeling of oneness and the enrichment of our own experience become possible through empathy.

(f) *Reiteration of Empathy—Reflexive Sympathy*

I would like to call attention to just one more concept from Lipps' description: that which he designates as "reflexive sympathy" and which I would like to call the reiteration of empathy, more exactly, a particular case of reiteration.

<19> Empathy has this attribute in common with many kinds of acts. There is not only reflection, but also reflection on reflection, etc. as an ideal possibility *ad infinitum*. Similarly, there is a willing of willing, a liking of liking, etc. In fact, all representations can be reiterated. I can remember a memory, expect an expectation, fantasy a fantasy. And so I can also empathize the empathized, i.e., among the acts of another that I comprehend empathically there can be empathic acts in which the other comprehends another's acts. This "other" can be a third person or me myself. In the second case we have "reflexive sympathy" where my original experience returns to me as an empathized one. The significance of this phenomenon in the give and take between individuals does not need to concern us here because we are only dealing with the general essence of empathy and not with its effect.

4. The Controversy Between the View of Idea and That of Actuality

Perhaps from the viewpoint of our description of empathic acts, we can find access to the much-discussed question of whether empathy has the character of an idea [*Vorstellung*] or of

actuality. [M.] Geiger has already stressed that this question is equivocal and that various points must be distinguished:²⁹ (1) Are empathized experiences primordial or not? (2) Are foreign experiences objectively given as something facing me or given experientially? (3) Are they intuitively or non-intuitively given (and if intuitively, in the character of perception or of representation)?

After the preceding discussion, we can flatly answer the first question in the negative. But we cannot so easily answer the second question in terms of our presentation. There is a two-sidedness to the essence of empathic acts: an experience of our own announcing another one. And there are various levels of accomplishment possible. For instance, we may turn toward the foreign experience and feel ourselves led by it. Or empathic explication may lead us to realize what was first vaguely meant. In the second case, one cannot speak of objectivity in a pregnant sense, even though the foreign experience certainly "is there" for me.

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The third question likewise requires further investigation. We have already seen what distinguishes empathy from perception and what they have in common. Perception has its object before it in embodied givenness; empathy does not. But both have their object itself there and meet it directly where it is anchored in the continuity of being. They need not represent it in order to draw it close. Mere knowledge [*Wissen*] is also characterized by this "encountering" by the subject, but is created in this encounter. It is nothing more. Knowledge reaches its object but does not "have" it. It stands before its object but does not see it. Knowledge is blind, empty, and restless, always pointing back to some kind of experienced, seen act. And the experience back to which knowledge of foreign experience points is called empathy. I know of another's grief, i.e., either I have comprehended this grief empathically but am no longer in the "intuiting" act, content with empty knowledge, or I know of this grief on the basis of a communication. Then the grief is not given to me intuitively, though surely to the communicator. (Should this be the griever himself, it is primordially given to him in reflection. Should it be a third person, he comprehends it non-primordially in empathy.)

And from his experience I once more have an experience, i.e., I comprehend the grief empathically. A further analysis of the relationship of “empathy” to “knowledge of foreign experience” is not required at this point. It is enough that we have reciprocally limited them.

<21> The conclusion from our discussion is that the original controversial question was badly put. Thus no answer to it could be correct. For example, Witasek, a particularly energetic defender of the view of idea,³⁰ does not take our distinctions into consideration at all. He takes the objective character of empathy to be proved along with its representational character. By a further equivocation of idea (which is an intellectual experience in contrast with an emotional one), he arrives at the absurd consequence of denying that empathized feelings involve emotion. He even bases his conclusion on a special argument: Empathy cannot involve feelings because the “assumption of feeling” is missing (the “something” to which feeling could be related). The empathizing subject would only assume feeling in the subject having the feelings if he were dealing with a projection [*Hineinversetzen*]. Witasek proves that the subject cannot be dealing with a projection, not by analysis of the experience of empathy, but by a logical discussion of possible meanings of projection. It could be a judgment, an assumption, or even a fiction that the empathizing subject is identical with the subject under consideration. Aesthetic empathy does not demonstrate all this and so it is not projection.

Unfortunately, the disjunction is not complete, exactly the possibility applying to the present case being missing. To project oneself into another means to carry out his experience with him as we have described it. Witasek’s contention that empathy is an intuitive idea of another’s experience only applies to the stage where empathized experiences are made into objects, not to the stage of fulfilling explication. And for this last case we cannot answer the question of whether it is “intuitive in terms of perception or in terms of idea (i.e., non-primordially)” because, as we have shown, empathy is neither one in the usual sense. In fact, it refuses to be classified in one of the current pigeonholes of psychology but will be studied in its own essence.

5. Discussion in Terms of Genetic Theories of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness

As we have seen, philosophical investigation has already often come to grips with the problem of foreign consciousness. But its question of how we perceive foreign consciousness has usually taken the turn of how in one psycho-physical individual the perception of another such individual occurs. This has led to the origination of theories of imitation, of inference by analogy, and of empathy by association.

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(a) On the Relationship of Phenomenology to Psychology

It may not be superfluous to elucidate the relationship of psychological investigations to what we are doing. Our position is that there is the phenomenon of “foreign experience” and correlatively the “perception of foreign experience.” For the present we may leave undecided whether there really is such a foreign experience or whether this perception is authentic. The phenomenon in which all knowledge and certainty must finally be anchored is indubitable. It is the genuine object of *πρώτη γίγνωσις*. Thus the first task in this domain, as in all domains, is to comprehend the phenomenon in its pure essence, freed from all the accidents of appearance. What is foreign experience in its givenness? How does the perception of foreign experience look? We must know this before we can ask how this perception occurs.

It is self-evident that this first question cannot in principle be answered by a genetic-psychological investigation of cause,³¹ for such an investigation actually presupposes the being whose development it is seeking to ground—its essence as well as the existence, its “what” as well as its “that.” Not only the investigation of the nature of the perception of foreign experiencing but also the justification of this perception must thus precede genetic psychology. And if this psychology alleges to accomplish both of these things itself, its claim must be rejected as thoroughly unjustified. This is not to dispute its title to existence in any way. On the contrary, it has its task already very definitely and unequivocally formulated. It is to investigate the origination of the knowledge

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that a real psycho-physical individual has of other such individuals.

Thus a rigorous delineation of what phenomenology and psychology are to accomplish for the problem of empathy by no means proclaims their complete independence from one another. Indeed, examination of the phenomenological method has shown us that it does not presuppose science in general and especially not a factual science. Thus phenomenology is not tied to the results of genetic psychology, either. On the other hand, psychology pretends to no assertions about the circumstances of the process it is investigating, and it does not occur to phenomenology to encroach upon its privileges. Nevertheless, psychology is entirely bound to the results of phenomenology. Phenomenology investigates the essence of empathy, and wherever empathy is realized this general essence must be retained. Genetic psychology, presupposing the phenomenon of empathy, investigates the process of this realization and must be led back to the phenomenon when its task is completed. If, at the end of the process of origination it delineates, a genetic theory finds something other than that whose origin it wanted to discover, it is condemned. Thus in the results of phenomenological investigation we find a criterion for the utility of genetic theories.

(b) *The Theory of Imitation*

Now we want to test present genetic theories in terms of our conclusions. Lipps endeavors to explain the experience of foreign psychic life by the doctrine of imitation already familiar to us. (To be sure, it appears in his writings as an element of description.) A witnessed gesture arouses in me the impulse to imitate it. I do this at least "inwardly," if not expressly. Moreover, I have the impulse to express all my experiences. Experience and expression are so closely associated that when one occurs it pulls the other after it. Thus we participate in the experience of the gesture together with this gesture. But, since the experience is experienced "in" the foreign gesture, it does not seem to me to be mine, but another's.

We do not want to go into the objections that can be raised against this theory nor those which have already been raised, with

or without justification.³² We only want to employ for criticism what we have already worked out for ourselves. We must therefore say that this theory only distinguishes our own from foreign experience through affiliation with different bodies, while both experiences are actually different in themselves. By the means indicated, I do not arrive at the phenomenon of foreign experience, but at an experience of my own that arouses in me the foreign gestures witnessed. This discrepancy between the phenomenon to be explained and that actually explained suffices as a refutation of this "explanation."

In order to clarify this discrepancy, let us analyze a case of the second kind. We are familiar with the fact that feelings are aroused in us by witnessed "phenomena of expression." A child seeing another crying cries, too. When I see a member of my family going around with a long face, I too become upset. When I want to stop worrying, I seek out happy company. We speak of the contagion or transference of feeling in such cases. It is very plain that the actual feelings aroused in us do not serve a cognitive function, that they do not announce a foreign experience to us as empathy does. So we need not consider whether such a transference of feeling presupposes the comprehension of the foreign feeling concerned, since only phenomena of expression affect us like this. On the contrary, the same change of face interpreted as a grimace certainly can arouse imitation in us, but not a feeling. It is certain that as we are saturated by such "transferred" feelings, we live in them and thus in ourselves. This prevents our turning toward or submerging ourselves in the foreign experience, which is the attitude characteristic of empathy.³³

If we had not first comprehended the foreign experience in some other way, we could not have brought it to givenness to ourselves at all. At most we could have concluded the presence of the foreign experience from a feeling in ourselves which required the foreign experience to explain its lack of motivation. But thus we would only have gotten a knowledge of, not a "givenness" of, the foreign experience, as in empathy. It is also possible for this transference itself to be experienced so that I feel the feeling, which was at first a foreign feeling, overflowing me. (For instance, this would be the case if I seek out cheerful company to

cheer me up.) Here, too, the difference between comprehending and taking on a feeling is clearly apparent.

Finally, in all cases there is a distinction between the transference of feeling and not only empathy, but also sympathy and a feeling of oneness, these latter being based on an empathic submersion in the foreign experience.³⁴ From what we have said, it should be sufficiently clear that the theory of imitation cannot serve as a genetic explanation of empathy.

(c) *The Theory of Association*

<26> The theory of association is a rival of the theory of imitation. The optical image of foreign gestures reproduces the optical image of our own gestures. This reproduces the kinesthesia and this, in turn, the feeling with which the kinesthesia was linked earlier. This feeling is now experienced not as our own, but as foreign, because (1) it faces us as an object, (2) it is not motivated by our own previous experiences, and (3) it is not expressed by a gesture.

Here, again, we want to raise the question of whether the phenomenon of empathy stands at the end of this process of development. And again the answer is no. By the proposed course we arrive at a feeling of our own and we have grounds for viewing it not as one of our own feelings, but as a foreign one. (At this point we can waive the refutation of these claims.) Now, on these grounds we could conclude that this is another's experience. But in empathy we draw no conclusions because the experience is given as foreign in the character of perception.

Let us illustrate this opposition in a typical case of comprehending foreign psychic life in terms of the theory of association. I see someone stamp his feet. I remember how I myself once stamped my feet at the same time as my previous fury is presented to me. Then I say to myself, "This is how furious he is now." Here the other's fury itself is not given but its existence is inferred. By an intuitive representation, my own fury, I seek to draw it near.³⁵ By contrast, empathy posits being immediately as a perceived act, and it reaches its object directly without representation. Thus the theory of association also fails to reveal the genesis of empathy.

I realize that this type of associative explanation (Prandtl's) probably does not include all associational psychologists. According to Paul Stern, for example, association is not merely the linking of single ideas, one reproducing another, but is the unity of a perceptual context [*Erfahrungszusammenhang*] in which this context is always before us as a whole. Such a perceptual context is both outside of and within an individual.

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But this raises more questions. Certainly association should mean more than the descriptive unity of a perceptual context. It should certainly explain how it arrives at this unity. Thus perhaps all that is given to consciousness at the same time is linked to a whole reproduced as such. But then what distinguishes the unity of the objects of my visual field (that can again arise before me as a whole), from the unity of one object? We cannot do everything in this case with the one word "association." Further, for such a perceptual context to originate, certainly at some time its parts must be given together. But when do I have a person's inner and outer sides given together?

Actually, such cases do occur. Someone has an expression at first unintelligible to me, for instance, he may put his hand over his eyes. On inquiry, I learn that he is meditating deeply on something just now. Now this meditation that I empathize becomes "connected by association" with the perceived pose. When I see this pose again, I see it as a "meditative" pose. Then in this repeated case empathy is, as a matter of fact, based on association. But this association itself requires an empathic act, thus does not suffice as a principle to explain empathy.³⁶ Furthermore, association only mediates knowledge, for we say to ourselves that this is how he looks when he is meditating. Association does not mediate our understanding of this pose as the expression of an inner condition. This I gain in empathic projection as follows: He is meditating; he has his mind on a problem and wants to shield his train of thought from disturbing distractions; therefore he is covering his eyes and cutting himself off from the outer world.³⁷

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We must distinguish Volkelt's theory of fusion from this theory of association. Volkelt says that the felt content is not linked with intuition but fused with it. Of course, this is not a genetic explanation but only a description of the empathic experience. Later we

shall return to this phenomenon and see that this viewpoint clarifies the origin of certain empathic experiences.³⁸ This clarification is certainly far from the kind of "exact explanation" the theory of association is intended to give. Whether such an explanation can be given at all is still in question. This question can only be decided when the old, much discussed and still so disputed concept of association has been adequately clarified. Thus we support Volkelt in his position against Siebeck in which the former maintains that the unity of a material content with its psychic content is not explained by mere association.³⁹ On the other hand, we must agree with Siebeck if he finds a satisfactory genetic explanation of empathy lacking in Volkelt.⁴⁰

(d) *The Theory of Inference by Analogy*

The theory of inference by analogy to explain the origin of the experience of foreign psychic life was almost generally acknowledged before Lipps opposed it. The standpoint of this theory (for example, J. S. Mill's view) is as follows. There is evidence of outer and of inner perception, and we can only get at the facts that these perceptions furnish by means of inferences. This applies to the present case as follows: I know the foreign physical body and its modifications; I know my own physical body and its modifications. Further, I know that the modifications of the latter are conditions and implications of my experiences, likewise given. Now, because in this case the succession of physical appearances can only take place when linked with experience, I assume such a linkage where physical appearances are given alone.

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Here, again, we shall only put our old question. Before, we could point out that the other theories did not lead to the perception of foreign consciousness. Here we see the still more striking fact that this phenomenon is simply ignored. This theory maintains that we see nothing around us but physical soulless and lifeless bodies, though I do not see how its advocates could actually hold such a belief.

After our earlier expositions, nothing further is required to refute the doctrine of inference by analogy as a genetic theory.⁴¹ Nevertheless, I would like to linger here a little longer in order to take this odium of complete absurdity from the theory when we

only consider it from the one side. Even so, we cannot deny that inferences by analogy do occur in knowledge of foreign experience. It is easily possible for another's expression to remind me of one of my own so that I ascribe to his expression its usual meaning for me. Only then can we assume the comprehension of another "I" with a bodily expression as a psychic expression. The inference by analogy replaces the empathy perhaps denied. It does not yield perception but a more or less probable knowledge of the foreign experience.⁴² Further, this theory does not really intend to give a genetic explanation, though it also occurs as such, and so we must present it here with the others. Rather, it intends to demonstrate the validity of our knowledge of foreign consciousness. It specifies the form in which knowledge of foreign consciousness is "possible." But the value of such an empty form, not oriented toward the nature of knowledge itself, is more than doubtful. Exactly how appropriate the inference by analogy would be for such a demonstration cannot be treated here.

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Thus we conclude from our critical excursions that none of the current genetic theories can account for empathy. Of course, we can guess why this is so. Before one can delineate the genesis of something, one must know what it is.

6. Discussion in Terms of Scheler's Theory of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness

We have still to measure empathy against one more theory of foreign consciousness that deviates considerably from all those discussed so far. According to Scheler,⁴³ we perceive the foreign "I" with its experience inwardly just as we perceive our own "I." (We need not go into his polemic against empathy, since it is not directed against what we call empathy.) Initially there is "a neutral stream of experience" and our "own" and "foreign" experiences are first gradually crystallized out of it. To illustrate this, he cites the fact that we can experience a thought as our own, as foreign, or even as neither of these. Further, initially we do not come upon ourselves as isolated, but as placed in a world of psychic experience. At first we experience our own experiences much less than those of our environment. Finally, out of our own

experiences we only perceive what moves along prescribed courses, especially those objects for which we already have a previous term.⁴⁴

<31> This bold theory, standing in opposition to all theories up to now, has something extremely seductive about it. Nevertheless, to get some clarity, we must examine precisely all the concepts used here. Thus we first ask what inner perception is. Scheler answers that inner perception is not the perception of self, for we can perceive ourselves as our bodies outwardly, too. Rather, inner perception is distinguished from outer perception by being directed toward acts. It is the type of act giving us the psychic. These two modes of perception are not to be distinguished on the basis of a difference of objects. Conversely, the physical is to be distinguished from the psychic because, in principle, it is differently given.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Scheler's critique does not seem to corroborate earlier attempts to reciprocally limit psychic and physical⁴⁶ by distinguishing criteria. It deals solely with an essential difference of givenness and not with the distinction between objects having different modes of being. To such objects a different mode of givenness would essentially [*wesensgesetzlich*] correspond. We could accept "inner perception" in this sense of a definitely constituted act without creating a conflict with our doctrine of empathy. (A more precise explication follows immediately.) It is possible to differentiate within this species of "inner perception" acts in which our own and foreign experience are given.

<32> But this is still not sufficiently clear. What do "own" and "foreign" mean in the context in which Scheler uses them? If we take his discussion of a neutral stream of experience seriously, we cannot conceive of how a differentiation in this stream can occur. But such a stream of experience is an absolutely impossible notion because every experience is by nature an "I's" experience that cannot be separated phenomenally from the "I" itself. It is only because Scheler fails to recognize a pure "I," always taking "I" as "psychic individual," that he speaks of an experience present before "I's" are constituted. Naturally, he cannot exhibit such an "I-less" experience. Every case he brings up presupposes our own as well as the foreign "I" and does not verify his theory at all.

Only if we leave the phenomenological sphere do these terms make good sense. "Own" and "foreign" then mean: belonging to different individuals, i.e., different substantial, qualitatively elaborated, psychic subjects. Both these individuals and their experiences would be similarly accessible to inner perception. Suppose that I do not feel mine, but foreign feelings. Accordingly, this means that feelings have penetrated my individual from the foreign individual. I am initially surrounded by a world of psychic occurrences, that is to say, at the same time as I discover that my body is in the world of my outer experience against the background of the spatial world spread out boundlessly on all sides, I also discover that my psychic individual is in the world of inner experience, a boundless world of psychic individuals and psychic life.

All this is certainly incontestable. But the basis here is altogether different from ours. We have excluded from the field of our investigation this whole world of inner perception, our own individual and all others, together with the outer world. They are not within, but transcend, the sphere of absolute givenness, of pure consciousness. The "I" has another meaning in this sphere of absolute consciousness, being nothing but the subject of experience living in experience. In these terms, the question of whether an experience is "mine" or another's becomes senseless. What I primordially feel is precisely what I feel irrespective of this feeling's role in the sum total of my individual experiences or of how it originates (perhaps by contagion of feeling or not).⁴⁷ These experiences of my own, the pure experiences of the pure "I," are given to me in reflection. This means that the "I" turns back and away from its object and looks at the experience of this object.

Now what distinguishes reflection from inner perception, more exactly, from the inner perception of self? Reflection is always an actual turning toward an actual experience, while inner perception itself can be non-actual. In principle, it can also encompass the fringe of non-actualities that form my present experience together with perception. Further, I may view my experiences in such a way that I no longer consider them as such, but as evidence of the transcendence of my individual and its attributes. My recollections announce my memory to me; my acts of outer percep-

tion announce the acuteness of my senses (not to be taken as sense organs, of course); my volition and conduct announce my energy, etc. And these attributes declare the nature of my individual to me. We can designate this viewing as inner perception of self.

We have reliable evidence for the contention that Scheler's "inner perception" is the apperception of "self" in the sense of the individual and his experiences within the context of individual experience. He ascribes complexes of experience to the objects of inner perception which come to givenness in a uniform intuitive act, for example, my childhood.⁴⁸ (Of course, I would not call this perception, but one of those "abridgments of memory" [*Erinnerungsabrégés*] alluded to earlier. We must reserve an analysis of this for the phenomenology of representational consciousness.)

Further, he means that the "totality of our 'I'" is given in inner perception just as in the act of outer perception; not single sensual qualities, but the totality of nature is given.⁴⁹ Scheler could not characterize this totality more clearly than as an apperception of a transcendence even if he stressed the difference between the unity in variety characteristic of inner and of outer perception (or "separateness" and "togetherness").⁵⁰ This "I" is fundamentally different from the pure "I," the subject of actual experience. The unities constituted in inner perception are different from the unity of having an experience. And the inner perception giving us these complexes of experience is different from the reflection in which we comprehend the absolute being of an actual experience.

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Scheler himself distinguishes between reflection and inner perception,⁵¹ which he denies is a comprehension of acts in contrast with reflection. Thus it is still more striking that he did not see the distinction between his own and Husserl's concept of "inner perception," and that he even carries on a polemic against Husserl's preference for inner perception over outer.⁵² Precisely because the term "inner perception" could have a number of meanings, Husserl substituted "reflection" for it to designate the absolute givenness of experience.⁵³ Nor would he say that inner perception in Scheler's sense was more conclusive than outer perception.

The difference between reflection and inner perception also becomes very clear in a consideration of the deceptions of inner perception presented in Scheler's *Idolenlehre*. Should I be deceived in my feelings for another person, this deception cannot mean that I comprehend an act of love by reflection that is not present in fact. There is no such "reflective deception." Should I comprehend an actual erotic emotion in reflection, I have an absolute not to be interpreted away in any manner. I can be deceived in the object of my love, i.e., the person I thought I comprehended in this act may in fact be different, so that I comprehended a phantom. But the love was still genuine. Perhaps, also, the love does not endure as one expected, but ceases very shortly. This is not a reason, either, for saying it was not genuine as long as it lasted. But Scheler is not thinking of such deceptions.

The first kind of "idol" he presents is a deceptive directing. As we live in the feelings of our environment, we take them for our own, though they do not clarify our own feelings at all. We take feelings "acquired by reading" to be our own. For instance, the young girl thinks she feels Juliet's love.⁵⁴

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I think we still need distinctions and thorough analyses here. Suppose that I have taken over from my environment a hatred and contempt for the members of a particular race or party. For example, as the child of conservative parents, I may hate Jews and social democrats, or raised with more liberal views, I may hate "Junkers" [aristocratic landowners]. Then this would be an entirely genuine and sincere hatred save for the fact that it is based on an empathic valuing, rather than on a primordial one. This hatred may also be increased by contagion of feeling to such a degree that it is not legitimately related to the felt disvalue. Thus I am not under a deception when I comprehend my hatred. Two deceptions can be present here: (1) a deception of value (as I think I comprehend a disvalue that does not exist at all); (2) a deception about my person, if I were to imagine, on the basis of my own insight, that these feelings are exalted and view my prejudice as "loyalty." In the second case there is really a deception of inner perception but certainly not a deception of reflection.⁵⁵ I cannot be clear in reflection about the failure of the basic primordial

valuing because I cannot reflect on an act that is not present. But should I carry out such an act and bring it to givenness to myself, I gain clarity and thus also the possibility of unmasking the earlier deception by comparing it with this case.

<36> Feelings “acquired by reading” are no different. Should the enamored schoolboy think he feels Romeo’s passion, this does not mean he believes he has a stronger feeling than is actually present. He actually feels passion because he has blown his spark into a flame by borrowed embers. This flame will go out of its own accord as soon as the embers die out. Because a primordial valuing is lacking as a foundation, we also have “non-genuineness” here. This results in a false relationship between the feeling, on the one hand, and its subject and object, on the other. And the youth’s deception is that he attributes Romeo’s passion to himself, not that he thinks he has a strong feeling.

Now let us look at the other deceptive directing where experiences actually present do not come to givenness. I do not see how we can call a feeling actually present a deception if, because it is beyond traditional lines, it is not perceived. The turning toward our own experience naturally means the cessation of the foreign attitude. It requires special circumstances to direct attention to our own experiencing. Thus, if I do not notice a feeling because nothing has made me aware that there is “such a thing,” this is entirely natural and is deceptive as little as my not hearing a sound in my environment or overlooking an object in my visual field.⁵⁶ Scheler is certainly not discussing deceptive reflection, for “reflection” is the comprehension of an experience, and it is trivial to say that an experience I comprehend does not elude me. It is a different story if the experience does not elude me but I take it, rather, to be imagined because it does not fit in with my environment. Here it seems that I do not want to participate in this experience and would like to get it entirely out of my world. It is not that I think the experience is non-primordial and am actually deceived.

<37> If the motive of our behavior deceives us,⁵⁷ we are, again, not perceiving a motive in reflection that is not present. Either we experience no clearly conscious motive for our conduct or there

are other motives operating besides the motive before us. We cannot bring these other motives clearly to givenness to ourselves because they are not actual, but “background,” experiences. For the reflecting glance to be directed toward an experience, this experience must assume the form of a specific “cogito.” For example, suppose that I go into the military service as a volunteer under the impression that I am doing so out of pure patriotism and do not notice that a longing for adventure, vanity, or a dissatisfaction with my present situation also play a part. Then these secondary motives withdraw from my reflecting glance just as if they were not yet, or no longer, actual. I am thus under an inner perceptual and value deception if I take this action as it appears to me and interpret it as evidence of a noble character. People are generally inclined to ascribe to themselves better motives than they actually have and are not conscious of many of their emotional impulses at all⁵⁸ because these feelings already seem to have a disvalue in the mode of non-actuality, and people do not allow them to become actual at all. But this does not cause the feelings to cease enduring or functioning. The fact that we can feel past or future events to be valuable or worthless when they themselves are no longer, or not yet, “conceived” is also based on this difference between actuality and non-actuality.⁵⁹ Thus, an actual valuing can be based on a non-actual memory or expectation. We can hardly hold that this would be a pure valuing without a basic, theoretical act. There are no such experiences contradicting the essence of the experience of value.

Scheler is also dealing with “background experiences” when he says that the same experience can be perceived more or less exactly.⁶⁰ A pain that “entirely disappears from our glance or is only present as a very general impression while we are laughing and joking” is a non-actual experience persisting in the background while the “I” is living in other actualities. We can only say that an experience is differently “presented” in the contexts of the perceptions into which it enters. No matter how figuratively we take it, an experience comprehended in reflection has no “sides.”

In conclusion, by this contrast we can understand why Scheler distinguishes between “peripheral” experiences that sever one

another in sequence and “central” experiences that are given as a unity revealing the unity of the “I.” We have a sequence at all levels in the sense that one actual experience severs another. But some experiences disappear as soon as they have faded out (a sensory pain, a sensory delight, an act of perception), while others continue to endure in the mode of non-actuality. The latter form those unities that enable us to glance perceptually back into the past (at a love, a hatred, a friendship), and they constitute the complex structure that can come to givenness to us in an intuitive act, such as my childhood, my student days, etc.⁶¹ I hope this exhibits the difference between reflection in which actual experience is given to us absolutely and inner perception in general. Also this should indicate the difference between the complex unities based on these different acts and the individual “I” revealing itself in them.⁶²

Now we can already see the relationship between inner perception and empathy. Just as our own individual is announced in our own perceived experiences, so the foreign individual is announced in empathized ones. But we also see that in one case there is a primordial, while in the other a non-primordial, givenness of the constituting experiences. If I experience a feeling as that of another, I have it given twice: once primordially as my own and once non-primordially in empathy as originally foreign. And precisely this non-primordially of empathized experiences causes me to reject the general term “inner perception” for the comprehension of our own and foreign experience.⁶³ Should one desire to stress what these two experiences have in common, it would be better to say “inner intuition” [*innere Anschauung*]. This would include, then, the non-primordial givenness of our own experiences in memory, expectation, or fantasy.

But there is still another reason why I object to including empathy under inner perception. There is really only a parallel on the level of empathy where I have the foreign experience facing me. The level where I am at the foreign “I” and explain its experience by living it after the other seems to be much more parallel to the primordial experience itself than to its givenness in inner perception.